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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

HENRY CHILD,
Plaintiff and Appellant

vs.

Case No. 9082

COY J. HALWARD and
ALDIN 0. HAYWARD,
Defendants and Respondents

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the Decree of the
Second Judicial District Court for Davis County,
State of Utah
Before the Honorable Charles G. Cowley, Judge

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an action for rescision, or in the alternative,
for the reasonable value of a tract of real property, and
determination of a property boundary line based on a
uniform real estate contract between the parties.
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, DISPOSITION lN LOWER ~COURT..
T4e~ case w~s tried:- to.: the Court. From a decree based
on a_ motio~ · for suml;nary judgement on behalf of the

.De.~en_sfants,_ ~enyfng Plaintiff's petition. for a rescision
· and ,granting to .the Defendants a decree in the nature
of ,srecific ·performartce, ordering the conveyance of real
· prop~rty which is the ·subject matter of this· action, and
determining boy.ndary of~ real property, the Plaintiff
appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
. The Plaintiff seeks a reversal as a Matt~r of Law of
·the· decision of the trial Court, that the matter be referred
· 'to the trial Court for a continued hearing of evidence of
· the Defendants and that judgement be entered at the time
·giving due consideration to the points of Law hereinafter
·set forth.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At an undertermined date, but prior to the execution
of the unifo.r~ real estate contract herein, the Defendants
~ontemplated ol?taining .land located at the corner of Or. chard Drive and Virg~nia Lane in Davis County, Utah,
,for the purpose of construction of a market. (T-9, T-10
and T-49) The Defendants have another market in
Bountiful, and they contemplated expansion. (T-13) At
some time between the conception of their plan and the
expansion, they decided to lease to Mayfair Markets.
(T-63, T-64) It was in an effort to put together a land
block large enough to support a super market that the
Defendants entered into the negotiations which resulted
in the uniform real estate contract before the Court. (Ex.
D-1, T-9, T-10) Sometime in February or March,. 1958,
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at an undetermined time (T-12), the Defendant Aldin
Hayward began to negotiate with the Plaintiff Henry
Child for the purpose of purchasing a strip of land located
to the east of other land which had been obtained for the
purpose above mentioned. (T-11, T-71) Plaintiff Child,
during the course of these negotiations, had refused to
sell, and had indicated that he had no desire to sell. (T-72,
T-156) Then on a certain evening, the date of which is
unknown, but probably in March of 1958 (T-78), Aldin
Hayward approached the Plaintiff Henry Child, and told
him that he had a house to move off the corner near
Orchard Drive and that he needed a place to which he
might move the house. (T-72, T-73) The Defendant Aldin
Hayward asked Plaintiff Child to sell him a piece of
ground to which this house might be moved. (T-37, T-38)
On this occasion the Plaintiff agreed to a transaction involving a tract of land measuring 122 feet by 209 feet,
being rectangularly shaped and being 122 feet east and
west and 209 feet north and south. At this time the Plaintiff specifically told the Defendant Aldin Hayward that
he would not sell the South 122 feet of this tract, either
to the Defendant Aldin Hayward under any circumstances. (T-73, T-73, T-75, T-156) Having come to a tentative agreement, the Plaintiff and the Defendant Aldin
Hayward got into the Defendant's automobile and drove
to Bountiful where they consulted with Defendant's
attorney, Wendell Hammond. (T-26, T-48) Wendell Hammond drafted a memorandum agreement which embodied
the general terms as agreed upon by the parties. T-26,
T-40, T-41, T-50, T-75) Plaintiff and the Defendant had
not gone over the tract on this specific evening when the
memorandum was signed. (T-43) At the time the memo-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

randum was signed, $100.00 (Ex. D-2 was paid by Aldin
·Hayward by check to Henry Child T-15, T-16, T-17, T-25)
The date of this meeting has not been established. A copy
of the memorandum ~greement was never given to the
Plaintiff Henry Child, and the Defendant's copy has been
reported as lost -or destroyed. (T-17, T -43) Defendant
Aldin .Hayward reports that he never saves his personal
checks. (T-43) It was therefore impossible to _establish
the exact date of the memorandum agreement.
, ,. Either simultaneously with the negotiations. for the
purchase of the Plaintiff's property or shortly thereafter,
the Defendants negotiated with Eugene Child, estranged
son of the Plaintiff, and. obtained an agreement (Ex. D-9)
which would eventually· give the Defendants the property
the Plaintiff had reserved for his son. (T-29, T-30, T-43,
T-44 T-60 T-61 T-63 T-66 T-130 T-131)
'
'
'
'
'
The date of the document (Ex. D-9) by which Defendants obtained an interest from Eugene Child was
placed at April 9, 1958, by the Defendant Hayward. It
must be noted, however, that the date is fixed only by a
notation at the top of Exhibit D-9 which was made at
another time from the time of its execution, and with a
different pen. (T-30)
Some weeks after signing the memorandum agreement, a uniform real estate contract was prepared and
Plaintiff met with Defendant's attorney, Wendell Hammond, for the purpose of executing that agreement. ··At
that time the Plaintiff was not satisfied with the uniform
real estate contract which had been drawn up by Wendell
Hammond, counsel for Defendants, and he insisted that
a better description be used. (T-27, T-51) The new de-
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scription was ..prepared. by De(endapt~s- cou~el, Wenqell:
Hammond. (T-59) -After whi-ch d~scriptie:p., ·t~e. Plaintiff
insisted that the words:
· · :.~ ;:;;J~.
"All of this said tracf lies west·of· a line continuing
north from- the cement wall on tne east·part .of the
· adjacent Eugene Child tract."
,. ··be ·added to the cOntract in order to ·make· sure-tha-t ari~
other survey description would not be ::used··whi~h: would
place the boundary line far east of th~ poiht which'would
encompass 122 feet actually described. :There _was also
added to the contract, at the req~est ofthe Plaintti;l: Henry
Child, the following words:. .
· ·..
. · ·. ·· · . . ·
"When Buyers receive. De.ed from Seller,;. they
agree to convey to Eug~ne·~}_lildth:e sou~h ~5 fee~
of said tract by 122 feet. east and west ·without
compensation therefor."· (T-27, T-60)
The revised contract (Ex. D-1) was then signed.by Henry
Child and by Aldin Hayward on June 2, 1958. At the same
time, a check in the amount of $40Q·~OO for the balance of
the down payment was made payable to Henry Child,
Plaintiff. (T-45, T--80) The description finaJly:tisea on the
real estate contract was selected by Wendell ·Hammond,
counsel for Defendants. (T-79) ·Plaintiff never did refer
to boundaries on the ground and W endeli Hammond,
Defendant's attorney; provided the terms that the "entire
tract being conveyed would lie west of the cem~nt wall
marking the· eastern boundary of Eugene -Child's. property." (T-79, T-115, T-116) The Pla~nt~ff .,·all~g~d ~t ... all
times that he was selling 122. f~.et.meas1fred from the west
boundary of his property to the ~~~t ..
The Plaintiff Henry Child discussed the reservation
of the 45 feet by 122 feet for the use and benefit of his son
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Eugene Child· with the Defendant Aldin Hayward and
with Defendant's counsel, Wendell.Hammond, at the time
of the Memorandum. It was also discussed two or three
times during· the preparation of the uniform real estate
contract. The reservation was also discussed once when
the uniform real estate. contract was prepared and not
signed and also again at the time -of final execution. (T-62,
T-64, T-65, T-56, T-170, T..;78) During all of these encounters bet,Neen the Defendants andjor Defendant's
counsel and the Plaintiff, all of which were before signature of the final uniform real estate contract entered into,
the Defendants never took the trouble to advise Plaintiff
of.the agreement to purchase the 45 foot by 122 foot tract
from Eugene Child. {T-62, T-64, T~65, T-78, T-156, T-66,
T-67; T-170) ·A-ldin Hayward·testified
.

J

Quoting from Page 32 of. the Transcript:
Q

You knew the contents of the uniform real
estate contract?

A It was

discus~ed

that evening.
-

.Q You knew about this paragraph which refers
to this 45 feet by 122 feet which was to .be
conveyed to ·Eugene Child?
·
A That's right.
Q

An~

you didn't at that time advise Mr. Child
that you had arranged to _purchase this land
from Eugene?

A. Mr. ·Child knew that I was negotiating with
this. Mr. Child knows that I tried to get the
Child boys and later him to buy the Williams
home and move in this area on lots· east of
Eugene's.
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Q Mr.

Hay~ar~,

you are not being entirely responsive to my question. I have asked you if
you in any way made Mr. Harry-Uenry Child
aware of the existence of this agreement at the
time you signed this contract? I think that can
be answered yes or no.
A I can say that Mr. Child knew that I was negotiating with these people for all this land before the agreement was signed. I think this was
very well understood by him. Well,,· what I
want to ask is how I could move a home up
onto there if there wasn't some type of negotiating on it.
_ Q. Mr. Hayward, I am sure you will have an opportunity to ·explain everything that your at~
·torneys will want to bring out in this case. At
the present time, I would like to ask you to
. restrict your answers to that which is in response to the question. I would.liketo··ask you
again whether or not at the time this uniform
real estate contract was signed, you in any
way made Mr. Henry Child aware that you
had· negotiat~d an agreement· with·. -Eugene
Child to take that land?
A Yes, I think Mr. Child knew· that we were
negotiating on this land.
(Recess)

Q Mr. Hayward, at the time you signed the uniform real estate contract, had you. advised Mr.
Henry Child,. the Plaintiff, that you had entered into an .agreement to purchase this 45
by 122 foot tract from Eugene Child?
THE COURT: You can answer it yes or no.
A Let me say that I think that his son-he was
living with his son Brandt, and Brandt was go-
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·ing· back -and forth with Eugene and Wallie.
And I rather .think that if there was any discussions in advance or so, that he knew everything that went on.
-

-

MR. P 1,\.CE: -:You Honor, I will ask to have the witness instructed to answer the question yes or no.
·THE COURT: Yes. You can answer the question
yes or no.
A I don't know.
Further, Mr. Hammond, Defendant's attorney, testified concernir;tg the paragraph with respect to the 45 by
122 foot tract of land as ts found o_n -Page 60 ·of the Record
as follows:
Q

Now. I presume ~hat this paragraph was put in
this contract under direction in your office?

A I did it myself .

. Q Could you tell me, Mr. Hammond, who it was
that i~str~cted_ you that this paragraph or a
similar paragraph should be included in the
contract? A Well, my recollection is this. That we discussed
it. We discussed it more tha..11. once in r~gard to
a variety of things in that regard. And it's my
recqllectiori that t}lat was just agreed upon be. tween the parties. That is, Aldin Hayward and
Harry· Child. That that was what was understood. So I put it in according to their instructions. It was something-! don't think Harry
directed it at all. It was just agreed between
them that that would be done, so I inserted it
like that.
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Wendell Hammond, counsel for Defendants again
testified as found on page 66 and 67 of the record:
Q And so am I correct then that all three parties

were present when_it.was signed-Coy Hayward, AI~ ~ayward_ and Henry Child?

A: Yes. But not all signing at the same time. But
when ·it- was finalized, they were all present.

Q. Had. Ha_rry signed previous to this?
A Yes. That's my recollection.
Q And then it was taken down and Coy Hayward
and Aldin Hayward together in your presence
and in Mr. Child's presence then signed the

contract; is that correct?
A Yes, when Mr. Child was given the payment
there.

•

Q Do you recall as they signed this contract or
any time in your negotiations -in getting it

signed, do you recall whether or not either
one of the Haywards advised Mr. Child that
.they .had a contract to purchase this land from
Eugene Child?
A It wasn't a point that came up.

Q They didn't· volunteer this information?
A It wasn't a point that came up whatsoever, as
I recall.
Q Was it ever mentioned to your knowledge in

any of the negotiations in which you were
present with the Haywards and Mr. Child?
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-.A: Well, I -J.mew of it and. talked to Harry about it.
·Q ·'Yes?·

: A I don't recall when first. I did, though.
·Q· -~Is "it your testimony that you· talked to Mr.
Child about the agreement that the Haywards
had wi~h Eugene Child; is that correct?

A · Well,

ju~t what dC?you mean by that?
J

Q ·Well, I am referring to t;his. You. just mentioned, Mr. Hammond, and I am just trying to
get this clear. You just mentioned that you
knew about the existence of this contract?

·A . Yes.
·Q

And-yo4 mep.tio_ned that you had discussed it
with- Harry Child? ·

A Yes.
•

Q . I was wondering, 'did you-.was this discussed
with H~rry <:;hild before or after signing these
contract?
··

A

Well, I -.really· don't recall.· You- see there is
:quite ·a ·bit :of· time elapsed when we signed
· that memorandum ·.and_ when the other was
finally signed-_·~ever~l _. weeks elapsed.

Q Wo_uldn't it be true that the first

tim~

you d~s
cuss~~ it witp _Harry Child was when he c~e
· · into your office and brought the· matter up,
when he had~ somehow obtained the informa~
tion about this contract?
,_

A

It might have been because 1 thought-then that
all that Harry wanted_ was for Gene to have·
this so he could make up for what had happened between them before, and I just somehow took that for ·granted that he just wanted
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to make up in some way for things that had
happened before in their troubles.
Plaintiff Henry Child testified referring to the time
of the final execution of the contract, as found on Page
170 of the record:
· · Q

All right, Mr. Child, at any time, did either
·Coy Hayward or Aldin Hayward tell you they
were negotiating. to purchase that 45 by 122
foot strip of land?

A No.

On March 26, 1959, an additional payment of $580.00
was made
to Plaintiff Henry Child by Coy Hayward
as
.
.
the first anniversary payment on the contract. T-80, T-81,
T-142, T-143) Plaintiff Henry Child stated that at that
time he accepted the first anniversary payment but pad
some misgivings about whether or not the contract was
being honored by the Defendants. (T-80, T-81, T-168)
because he had noticed that the Defendant had not moved
a house onto the property which he in<Ucated was his
purpose for the purchase. (T-82, T-140, T-141) Not long
after the first anniversary payment was made, the Plaintiff noticed that excavation work was being done on that
portion of real property which he had reserved in the
uniform real estate contract for delivery to his son. T-82,
T-141) He noticed that tqere was some excavation work
being done and that a water pipe was being moved from
that property. (T-82) At this time he approached Mr. Coy
Hayward at his store and told him that what was being
.

.
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dope with· his property was not according. to the agreement at all and that .he wanted to· return.the money paid
and take the property back. (T-99) He was told that if
he ·had ·any complaints ·he should go to the attorney of
the Defendants. Plaintiff did -go to Defendant's ·attorney,
Wendell Hammond. (T-100) On that occasion and on
subsequent occasions on which attorney Wendell Hammond and_ Plainti~ Henry ·Child talked; they discussed
the agreements of ·the Haywards to convey the 122 by 45
foot tract to Eugene Child. Wendell Hammond indicated
that this might_ have been the first time the matter of the
purchase from Eugene Child was discussed with the
Plaintiff. This time being w;hen the Plaintiff _came into his
office after having evidenced his ·dissatisfaction at the
handling of the property. (T~67) As 'is pointed out above,
at no time prior to the final execution of the uniform real
estate· contract . did attorney Wendell Hammond indicate
that he had mentioned to the Plaint~ff t:Qat the Defendants
H~yward had in fact obt~ined_a .contrq.ct ?etween themse~v~$· and Plaintiff's son,. _Eugepe Child, to buy the tract
me~sur~ng_ 4!5 by 122 feet ~rom_. ~ugene Child..Although
Aldin Hayward claims that Henry ChiJd, the PlainJiff,
knew that the Hayw-ards were negqtiati~g with all property holders in the are~ .. Henry C.h~ld was never directly
told by the Defendants qf ,their attorney that they int~nded to p:urchas~ this property from Plaintiff's son,
Eugen~ _Child. (r-62, T~_64, T-_65, T-66, T-67, T-32, T-170)
And that they in fact had ent~:red into negotiations with
Eug~ne Chil4 and ~ad obt~i~ed prior to the sigili:p.g of
the uniform real estate contract the document known as
Defendant's Exhibit 9. (T-104) .
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Grant Nielsen testified as an- appraiser that the value
ofthe 122by 209 foot tract was in the amount of $13,000.00
in 1958_. (T-86) He also stated that this figure was arrived.
at based on a value of 50c per square foot. (T-98)
The Pla~ntiff appeals from the judgement of the
Court requiring specific performance of the uniform
re~l estate contract and determining the eastern boundary of the property to be an extension of the cement wall
forming the east boundary of the Eugene Child tract.
ARGUMENT.
Point 1.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE PLAINTIFF A DECREE OF RESCISION OR COMPENSATION
FOR THE 45 BY 122 FOOT TRACT OF LAND.
A. FACTS PRESENTLY BEFORE THE COURT
SHOW A CONSTRUCTIVE MISREPRESENTATION
UPON WHI~H A RESCISION MAY BE BASED.
B. FACTS BEFORE THE COURT SHOW THE
CREATIO-N ,OF A CONSTRUCTIVE .TRUST IMPLIED
BY LAW FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PLAINTIFF.
C. FACTS BEFORE THE COURT SHOW AN INCOMPLETE AND UNDELIVERED GIFT FROM THE
PLAINTIFF TO THE PLAINTIFF'S SON, WHICH GIFT
IS STILL UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE PLAINTIFF
AND SUBJECT TO PLAINTIFF'S WITHDRAWAL.
A. FACTS PRESENTLY BEFORE THE COURT
SHOW A CONSTRUCTIVE MISREPRE.SENTATION
UPON WHICH A RESCISION MAY BE BASED.
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In this case the Defendants- rely upon the existence of
a memorandum and check showing an original agreement
existing between the Defendants and the Plaintiff, presumably dated on the 4th day of April, 1958, the date of
April 4th being determined by the anniversary date of
the contract~· This date is important to the Defendants
because it ·shows an ·execution of a -menorandum agreement prior to the date of- April 9, ·1958, which is the date
of ·the Denfedant's agreement with Eugene Child. Although the· memorandum should have been in the possession of the Defendants and the check by which payments
was made to the Plaintiff on the same date should have
been in the possession of the Defendants, and although
the same was requested by the Plain_tiff to be p~esented
in Court for examination of counsel arid the .Court, the
same was not presented, it ·bemg alleged that said doc~
ments were lost. Even so, it is ·obvious that the complex
being. put together on Orchard Drive and ··Virginia Lane
was a complex of property which to be functional would
have to .be composed as a unit. · Any portion· of. the unit
which was not obtained would substantially lessen the
value of ~lie entrre property. There is no question but that
-the 45 foot by_122 foot tract was important to the Defendants. It can therefore be assumed that when Aldin Hayward· approached the Plaintiff Henry Child at his residence ·to negotiate the purchase of the tract · of land
measuring 122 feet by 209 feet, he did so with the intent
of purchasing the . entire .tract. Plaintiff Henry Child
maintained continually that he would not sell the south
45 by 122 feet to the Defendants. With this knowledge in
mind, the Defendants nevertheless negotiated a preliminary memorandum on April 4th, a uniform real estate
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contract which was changed at the request of the Plaintiff,
and finally a uniform real estate contract which specifically set out the obligation of the Defendants to deliver a
certain tract of real property to Eugene Child, the son of
the Plaintiff. It is significant that there is in evidence an
agreement ostensibly dated the 9th of April, 1958, between Eugene Child and his wife, Armilla P. Child, and
the Defendants, by which Eugene Child and his wife
agree to convey the 122 feet by 45 feet south tract of land
-to the Defendants. It is also significant that the Plaintiff
had various discussions with counsel for the Defendants
and with the Defendants down to and including the time·
of the final contract which was executed, only one of these
conversations was held prior to the execution of the agreement of sale with Eugene Child. Nevertheless, there is
no evidence any place in the record where irt is alleged
that either of the Defendants or counsel for the Defendants took the time or the trouble to tell the Plaintiff
Henry Child about the agreement with Eugene Child
before the final execution of the contract.
On page 66 of the record the occasion when the contract. between Henry Child and the Defendants was finally executed was related, and Wendell Hammond indicates that Coy Hayward had several questions in regard
t.o th~ contract "because Coy was very particular. He
wanted to be sure that it was just as intended and asked
questions, and then he signed, yes."
Nevertheless, even though Coy Hayward was very
particular about many ,provisions of the contract, there
is no evidence in the record to indicate that the subject
of an agreement with Eugene Child was ever mentioned
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to the
signed.

~laintiff

Henry Child before the contract was

This Court has preViously discussed the elements of
fraud. In the case of Pace, etal, vs. Parrish, etal, ( 1952
l22l!tah 141) (247 Pacific 2nd 273) the Court specifically
states:
'

-

•

J

"This action being in deceit, based on fraudulent
misrepresentations, the burden was upon the
Plaintiff to prove all . of the essential elements
~her~of. These are: ( 1) that a representation was
.made, (2)' conce~ning"a presently existing material
'fact (3) which was false, (4) which the representor-either (a) knew to be false or (b) made
recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowI. edge upon which to base such representati_on.(5)
for the_purpose of inducing th~ other party to act
ll:POn it; ( 6) t4at the other party ~cting reasonably
and in ignorance of its falsity (7) did in fact rely
upon it and (8) was thereby induced to act (9)
· to his injury and damage."
In argument before the Lower Court, Defendants
made much of the necessity of an overt act of .misrepresentation. A· misrepresentation can be by act, by ommission, or by withholding information where it should in
-good conscience. be given.
...

\

. In America~ Jurisprudence, Vol. 23
ceit, Sec. 24, the general ~ule is stated:

~raud

and De-

"Representation may be made orally, by writing,
or by acts and conduct and arts and· artifices calculated to deceive ... in short ·each·party to a transaction must take care not to say or do anything
tending to impose upon the other and the mode
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of falsely representing a matter of fact is. immaterial."
The rule has been specifically applied in Regan vs.
First National Bank, an. Arizona case of 1940 (101 Pacific
2nd 214) (55 Arizona 320), in which it was stated:
"When one under duty to disclose facts to another
fails to do so, and the other is injured thereby, an
action in Court lies against a party whose failure
to perform his duty caused the injury."
Also in Stuart vs. Phoenix National Bank (62 Pacific
2nd 101) (39 ALR 3341937) it was stated:
"Where relation of trust or confidence exists between two parties so that one places peculiar reliance in trustworthiness of another, the latter is
·under a duty to make full and complete disclosure
of all material facts and is liable for misrepresentation or concealment."
In the instant case, the Defendant Aldin Hayward
was told many times by the Plaintiff that he would not
convey the south 122 by 45 feet of land. The Defendant
knew that it was not the intention of the Plaintiff to part
with that land to the Defendants. The Defendants were
made an agent of the Plaintiff for the purpose _of the
delivery of that land to his son. At the time the uniform
real estate contract was entered into, which contract is
dated some time in May, 1958, the agreement evidenced
by Defendant's Exhibit 9 between the Defendants and
Euge,ne Child, son of Henry Child, was already in existence. For the Defendants to execute
the uniform real
·,,
estate contract with the requirement of conveyance
clause in it was a tacit admission and agreement to perform a task which at that time was impossible of perform-
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18 .
ance because of the agreement in exjstence between the
n·efendants and Eugene Child. This misrpresentation was
material __because without the misrepresentation, _Henry
Child would not have entered into the. sale agreement.
The Defenda~t intended that the Plaintiff should act upon
their representation. It is obvious that the Defendants
w~re ~triving to put together a complex of real-property
in an' area where a large super ·market might be constructed. All of tJ;le repre~~ri~ations m~de. by the Defendants were made for the purpose of obtaining the contract
v\thich -they have in· their posses.sion. Plaintiff relied on the
representation madet in the- contract by the Defendants;
he .had the right to rely qpon it; he .had no r~ason but to
believe it;.~and he-was injured in that he was deprived of
the right to dispose of his property according- to his own
desires. Under the circumstances, to allow the Defendants
to "'hav~ the benefit of th·eir own wrongdoirig would be inequitable and not in accordance with the Law.
B .. FACTS BEFORE THE COURT SHOW THE
CREATION OF A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST IMPLIED
BY. LAW FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PLAINTIFF.
"Where

a speciai relationship exists between- the

p&rties,~· a c9nstructive trust will be created.· A
. ' . constructive trust is a trust created by the operation of· Law ·which arises contrary to intention
·against one who by fraud, .actual or constructive,
by duress or abuse of.confidence or commission.of
wrong or. any form of . unconscienable conduct,
artifice, concealm~nt or questionable means, or
'who in . any .way against equity and good conscience has obtained or holds· ·right to property
which he ought not, in equity and good conscience
hold and enjoy. This question is raised by equity to
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satisfy the demands of justice. A breach of confidence, rendering an acquisition of property by
one person unconscienable against another, raises
a constructive trust.''
(American Jurisprudence Vol. 54 Trusts Sec. 218)
In Renshaw vs. Tracy Loan and Trust Co. (1935) (87
Utah 364) ( 49 Pacific 2nd 403) the Court states that: "It
is the confidential relationship plus the abuse of the confidence thus imposed that authorizes equity to construct
a trust for the benefit of the party whose confidence has
been abused."
The Court further states:
"It is true that upon any establishment of certain
fiduciary relationships and transactions between
the parties to that relationship equity will presume.
fraud, the abuse of confidence and place the burden of proving good faith and fairness upon the
dominent party in the relationshrip."
Oklahoma case, Rees vs. Bruscoe (1957 (315
758) states:

Pa~ific

2nd

''A fiduciary relationship exists in all cases where
there has been a special confidance resposed in one
who in equity is bound to act in good faith and
v1ith due regard to interest of one reposing the
confidence. It arises wherever the trust is specially
resposed in skill or integrity of another, extends
to every possible case in which there is a confidance reposed in one side and resulting domination or influence on the other, and origin of confidence and source of influence is immaterial."
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se~ms

·American--Jurisprudence Vol .. 54 -Sec. 225
:the. general rule:

to state

-"'An abuse of (!Onfi~ance renderirig· the- acquisition
· or rete.n~io:p. o~ p~qperty "Qy one person unc<;>nscienable ~gai~_st' _anot~er''sUffi.c~s generally to ground
equitable relief in the form of a qeclaration ·and
enforcement -6f a: constructive tnist and the Courts
- are careful not- to limit the rule or the scope of its
_applica~ion by a_ ·narrow. definition, of fiduciary
or-.confi~antial rel~tionships prot~cted by it.''
The Defendants,- by virtue of the~r being selected
and .requested to chold and make conveyance at a future
date to _th~ party selected by_the Plaintiff would normally
be prohibited from personal traffic in the-trust estate, and
a trustee is under a duty to refrain from the private
applicat_ion
or appropri_ation·_ pf-_ttust
'property
or funds.
-·
.
,
A t~ust~e ·is ~~ all. t_irn~s q.isabl~d~ from. obtai:q.~ng any
personal bene!i,t, advantage, gain or. profit out of his administration of· a trust; his dealing with-the trust property
or his relationship'with·thertrust estate.·'Nothing in the
Law of fiduciary trusts is better.settled than that a trustee
shall not be allowed, to effect an advantage in dealing with
the trust estate. Lack of any fraud on the .part of the
tr\lstee will not validate a transaction having the effect
o~· rnak_ing_· for himself a _.P!O_fit out of th~ trust estate.
(Ame:rican Jurisprudence Vol. 54 Sec~ -313)
.

..

.

.•

,

.

Even in the event ·of the. failure of the Courts to·find
that there was actionable fraud, as set forth in Argument
No. 1, there is such :a confidantial relationship· and reliance on the. part OI t~~ Plaintiff' on 'the Defendants as
to cause the formation of a constructive trust. The De-
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fendants, then, as trustees of the property which they
took to convey to the Plaintiff's son were then prohibited
from dealing in the property which they held as trustees.
In the event the son of the Plaintiff, Eugene Child, did
not take the property, or for some reason had become
unable to take the property, the trust would fail, and
by Law would then revert to the Plaintiff or the Donor,
certainly the Defendants who had an interest in acquiring
the property and were actively pursuing that interest
and had entered into an agreement with Eugene Child
before executing the final uniform real estate con~ract.
On a number of occasions Defendants of their counsel
could have advised the Plaintiff of their completed negotiations with his son. In view of their knowledge of· his
stated purpose, the property constituting a gift to his
son, the failure to disclose on the part of the Defendants
can only be viewed as a deliberate stategem to obtain
title to land that could not otherwise be obtained.·

C. FACTS BEFORE THE COURT SHOW AN INCOMPLETE AND UNDELIVERED GIFT FROM THE
PLAINTIFF TO THE PLAINTIFF'S SON, WHICH GIFT
IS STILL UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE PLAINTIFF
AND SUBJECT TO PLAINTIFF'S WITHDRAWAL.
The Court erred in granting a Decree of specific performance covering the tract of land not being purchased
by the Defendants. By admission of all the parties in the
present action ,the Defendants were purchasing for their
own use and benefit, and had paid consideration for, only
the property measuring 122 feet by 164 feet. The tract
measuring 45 feet by 122 feet was included in the description with instructions from the Plaintiff that the same
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should be delivered to his son at the time a deed was
made. It is the contention of the Plaintiff that such a
transaction constitutes the Defendant an agent for and
in behalf of the Plaintiff for the purpose of carrying out
Plaintiff's instructions. Instructions were set out on the
uniform real estate contract as follows:
"When Buyers receive Deed from the Seller, they
agree to convey to Eugene Child the south 45" feet
of the said tract by 122 feet east and west without
compensation therefor.''
Until and unless the agent has performed the function
of delivering the gift to Eugene Child, the agency, by
~efinition, may be. revoked and canceled. The agent has
not been able to effect the gift because the agent has not
received a conveyance of the property from the Plaintiff.
In re Galinger's Estate 1948 ( 199 Pacific 2nd 575) 31
The Court further stated:
"A gift will not be presumed, but Donor's intention to make gift must be proved by clear, convincing strong and satisfactory evidence, and delivery
of property must be as perfect as the nature of
property and surroundings of parties will reasonably permit."
The Court further stated:
"Gifts intervivos and causa mortis must be fully
executed and there must be intention to transfer
title to property, delivery by Donor and acceptance by Donor."
In Thatcher vs. Merriam, 1952 a Utah case, (240 Pacific 2nd 266) 121 Utah 191) the Court stated:
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"The Courts have quite generally held that where
there is an assignment or conveyance in writing
that is delivered to the Donor, that the gift is not
defeated because the gift remains in possession of
the Donor. It must be remembered that asbetw~en
Donee and Donor it is not necessary to the validity
of a gift,. if made by a written instrument transferring title to the Donee, that possession of the
property also be delivered to the Donee.''
It will be noted, however, that the Court makes the
distinction in this landmark Utah case between those
cases wherein the Donor deals directly with the Donee.
In the instant case at hand, we have a contract between
tp.e Defendants and the Plaintiff, and by. virtue of this
contract, the Defendants are required to do certain things,
at some future date, and there is no delivery to the Donee,
nor is there delivery by the Donor to the .Donee of any
written instrument allowing or giving claim to the Donee
of the property hereunder discussion.
In the case of Thatcher vs. Merriam and similar cases
annotated in 63 ALR 537 it is stated as follows:
"It is almost universally held that a gift by instrument in writing is good without a delivery of the
property where the instrument is a deed or an
absolute conveyance."
The annotation goes on to state that in connection with
instruments of gift that are not deeds, the question of
whether delivery of the property is necessary is not easy
of solution, and further, it is generally held where the
paper is neither a deed, a sealed instrument nor a formal
instrument purporting to pass title, but is only an in-
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formal instrument, that it is insufficient to constitute a
gift without the delivery of the property. It is also significant to note that the annotation concerns itself with the
trans~ctions directly between the Donor and Donee. In
the instant case, the Donor and Donee have made no
contact one with another, and one reason that the Donor
allowed the instant contract to be drawn up was in order
to have the property eventually given to his son in a
circuitous route because of bad feelings. between the
father (Plaintiff) and son. In the instant case, the Defendant can only be considered as agent and agents of
the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff may terminate the agency at
will. Neither the Defendants nor the Donee have the
right at Law to force the conveyance of the 45 by 122
foot strip of property, and until said portion of property
is actually conveyed and the gift delivered and completed,
the Plaintiff has the right to withdraw his gift and appropriate it to some other purpose. The decision of the
Court granting specific performance deprives the Plaintiff of this right.
Respectfully submitted,
Lorin N. Pace
Attorney for the Appellant

Lorin N. Pace
Attorney at Law
19 West South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah
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